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construct a public space. When this statistical representation 
of society is developed in a national setting, it can be ques-
tioned by parliamentary or trade union representatives; its 
normativity remains under democratic control. But when this 
numerical representation of social reality seeks to transcend 
the other forms of representation and lay claim to worldwide 
validity, those checks and balances melt away. There is then a 
risk of enclosing oneself–and enclosing whole peoples–inside 
the self-referential loops of a technocratic discourse that over-
writes the realities of human life instead of representing them. 
Even local research capacities are caught up in just such a 
self-referential loop. They are mobilized not to design “anti-
poverty action plans”, but to implement them. Instead of ask-
ing indigenous researchers to formulate the questions raised 
by the reality of their compatriots’ living conditions, we ask 
them to ill in questionnaires designed in advance by interna-
tional organizations. The situation is not all that different in 
France. France’s “poor” (unlike the rich) are certainly the ob-
jects of unrelenting analysis by the social sciences, just as they 
are the objects of legal mechanisms to combat poverty, but it 
is extremely unusual for them to be treated as subjects and 
invited to share their experience of poverty.
Deprived of its local signiication, the notion of “poverty” 
is also robbed of its history and of the contradictory meanings 
that it has always conveyed. For centuries, even in the West, 
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Above all things, good policy is to be used, 
that the treasures and monies in a State 
be not gathered into few hands. 
For otherwise, a State may have a great stock, 
and yet starve ; and money is like muck, 
not good except it be spread
Francis Bacon
The Essays or Counsels, 
Civil and Moral [3rd ed. 1625]
Abstract. The normative dimension of the notion of poverty, and its embedding in the long history of cultures, 
is largely overlooked in contemporary political discourse. Legal analysis shows, however, that two opposing 
conceptions of poverty continue to do battle: one sees poverty as a social scourge, whose effects–but not its 
causes–can be counteracted; the other sees it as the manifestation of a social injustice which must be tackled 
at the root.
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In the political vocabulary of “globalization”, “poverty” has 
become an impoverished notion, one that does more to 
 obscure than to illuminate the question of social justice. In 
fact, it probably owes part of its remarkable success to its 
weakness as a concept. It has been stripped of its history and 
geography, and carefully washed clean of the soil of injustice 
in which its roots are steeped. 
Stripped of its geography, reduced to an indicator expressed 
in dollars, “poverty” is seen as a statistical datum, capable of 
being apprehended in the same way wherever it occurs on the 
surface of the earth, like epidemics or natural disasters. 
Deining extreme poverty as living on less than a dollar a day–
as the United Nations does in its Millennium Development 
Goals–only blinds us to all those aspects of the standard of 
living, of the quality of life, that are not amenable to monetary 
evaluation, because they derive meaning from their social and 
cultural context. It ignores the normative tendency, which–as 
the leading historians of statistics and practice have shown–is 
inherent to socio-economic categories. In his seminal work, 
Alain Desrosières demonstrated that, unlike the use of quanti-
ication in the natural sciences, economic and social statistics 
does not measure a pre-existing reality; it constructs a new 
reality by treating heterogeneous entities and forces as equiva-
lent. Like constitutions in the legal domain, statistical infor-
mation is by its very essence normative, and is used to 
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many saw it as an ideal: the straight and narrow path between 
misery and wealth, on which man could enjoy the basic mini-
mum of resources necessary to advance freely, without being 
weighed down by his material possessions. Generations of 
monks followed this path by taking the vow of poverty, and 
by a strange irony of history, it is this prohibition on wealth 
that led the Franciscans to invent the irst legal instruments of 
capitalism: foremost among them, the trust. The Franciscans, 
who did not themselves view poverty as a “third way”–as a 
golden mean between the extremes of opulence or destitu-
tion–saw the fate of the poor as inextricably bound up with 
that of the rich. But in so doing they adopted two diametri-
cally opposed interpretations, which continue to permeate 
our ways of thinking, and which shed light on differences of 
national legal culture with regard to poverty. 
For some, poverty is the manifestation of a transcendent 
justice, the mark–and the punishment–of vice, while wealth 
is a sign of virtue and talent. Present in the Old Testament 
tradition, which promises wealth and wellbeing on Earth to 
God’s chosen, this interpretation resurfaces in Protestantism: 
“God”, wrote Calvin, “gives abundantly to his own people 
the means to aid others, but the wicked are always so raven-
ous that their want leads them to have recourse to fraud and 
rapine”. According to Max Weber’s famous thesis, the “spirit 
of capitalism” is heir to this tradition, in which wealth is evi-
dence of divine election and poverty tends to be assimilated 
with sin. Over the last thirty years, numerous policy initia-
tives have given that idea renewed legal vitality. One of the 
key causes of unemployment is alleged to be laziness, en-
couraged by over-generous welfare handouts, which should 
therefore be reduced or made subject to the unconditional 
 acceptance of insecurity, deskilling and “lexibility”.
The other, opposing, tradition sees poverty, not wealth, as 
the sign of divine election. Behind its modern façade, its reli-
gious roots also go back a long way. This is the tradition that 
sings the Internationale, calling the “prisoners of starvation” 
to revolt: “The earth shall rise on new foundations: We have 
been naught, we shall be all!” The wretched of the capitalist 
earth are destined to become the chosen ones of the commu-
nist paradise. But this inversion of worldly values was al-
ready present in Bossuet, when he observed in his sermon 
“On the Eminent Dignity of the Poor”, that the “admirable 
reversal”, by which “the last will be irst and the irst will be 
last” (Matt. 20:16) has already begun in this life: “Since the 
poor are the last in the world they are the irst in the Church. 
The rich imagine that everything in the world belongs to 
them, and thus they trample the poor underfoot. Yet their only 
reason for being in the Church is in order to serve the poor.” 
According to Saint Augustine, “the burden of the poor is not 
having what they need, while the burden of the rich is having 
more than they need”. Bossuet deduced that alms were not an 
act of grace that the rich bestow upon the poor, but a service 
that the poor render to the rich, by allowing them to unload 
part of the burden of their wealth and thereby earn a legiti-
mate place among the community of the faithful. 
The idea of solidarity is already at work in this way of 
thinking which, contrary to economic liberalism, does not see 
poverty as part of the natural order of things, to which the law 
should conform: “For we ought not to desire”, wrote Saint 
Augustine, “that there be wretched persons in order that we 
may be able to perform works of mercy. You give bread to a 
hungry person, but it would be better were no one hungry, 
and you could give it to no one (…) Because you rendered 
service, you seem greater, as it were, than he to whom service 
was rendered. Wish him an equal, so that you may both be 
under the One to whom no service can be rendered”. Coming 
from a quite different direction, that of political realism, Sir 
Francis Bacon arrived at the same conclusion. His experience 
of government in 17th-century England led him to believe that 
“money is like muck, not good except it be spread”, so much 
so that to accrue wealth, instead of redistributing it, was to 
plant the seeds of trouble and sedition.
The opposition between these two interpretations of pov-
erty continues to be seen in the mirror of contemporary law. 
They have merely been stripped of their religious references. 
On one side, the view that sees poverty as a scourge of na-
ture: one can try, certainly, to mitigate its effects, but, like 
droughts or earthquakes, it is in the order of things, part of 
man’s lot, which it would be vain and even dangerous to try 
and change. On the other, the view that sees poverty as a so-
cial injustice, whose causes can and should be counteracted.
In the aftermath of the war, the social injustice interpreta-
tion initially came to predominate, and with it, the idea of 
solidarity between rich and poor. This was expressed as early 
as 1944 in the Declaration of Philadelphia, which stated that 
“Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity every-
where”. This Declaration inaugurated that brief period during 
which people strove to build an international legal order that 
would make social justice and the eradication of poverty the 
goal of all governments, their economic and inancial struc-
tures being mere instruments in the fulillment of that goal. 
This was the stance taken by the Havana Charter, signed in 
1948, the same year as the proclamation of economic and 
social rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Charter–which was never ratiied–provided for the 
 creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO), one of 
its missions being to realize the goals of full employment 
and higher living standards set out in the United Nations 
Charter. Its statutes directed it to ight against both surpluses 
and  deicits in the balance of payments, to favor economic 
cooperation instead of competition between states, to pro-
mote compliance with international labor standards, to con-
trol movements of capital, to help stabilize basic commodity 
prices… In short, its agenda was almost the exact opposite of 
that assigned to the World Trade Organization (WTO) when 
it was created in 1994. By condemning public surpluses as 
well as deicits, it made the balanced distribution of wealth 
the cornerstone of the ight against poverty, thereby  extending 
Francis Bacon’s political maxim into the ield of international 
relations. And by providing for legal instruments dedicated to 
maintaining the stability of basic commodity prices, it set out 
to create the conditions of economic security for all. From 
this legal perspective, poverty is seen not as an individual 
status, generating an entitlement to assistance, but as the con-
sequence of a systemic economic imbalance. 
The failure of this international social project did not 
 prevent the profusion, in domestic law, of systems of solidar-
ity that embodied economic and social rights, and allowed 
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unprecedented advances against poverty. But already it her-
alded the overturn of the hierarchy that placed human ends 
above material and inancial means, and a return to a natural-
istic conception of the economic order and distribution of 
wealth. In the 1970s, with the neoliberal revolution, the idea 
once again took hold that poverty stems not from human in-
justice, but from an immanent order whose laws must be 
obeyed. For many American neoconservatives, the belief in 
this order has preserved its religious–protestant or Old 
Testament–basis. At the international level, however, it lays 
claim to the authority of science. Friedrich Hayek, one of the 
founding fathers of ultra-liberalism, explains that it is igno-
rance of the rules that underpin the market economy that 
makes its results seem irrational and immoral. Therefore, he 
claims, “their demand for a just distribution in which orga-
nized power is to be used to allocate to each what he  deserves, 
is thus strictly an atavism, based on primordial emotions”. 
All institutions founded on the notion of solidarity derive 
from this “atavistic conception of distributive justice” and 
can only lead to the ruin of the “spontaneous order of the 
market”, based on “true prices” and the quest for personal 
gain. They must therefore be dismantled. Of course one can 
help the poor, but such help is a moral duty rather than a legal 
obligation. So it is that the rolling back of economic and 
 social rights today goes hand-in-hand with the promise of 
 advances in “ethics” and “corporate social responsibility”. 
They are two sides of the same coin, which the European 
Council embossed in 2005 with a pithy formula: “the 
European Union must […] make its regulatory environment 
more business-friendly, while business must in turn develop 
its sense of social responsibility”.
At the national level, the return of this interpretation of pov-
erty as a social scourge places the poor back in the gray area 
between social law and criminal law. On the one hand there is 
a proliferation of public charity mechanisms, designed to mit-
igate the effects of poverty. Most recently in France, the 
Revenu de solidarité active, which accords the poor a “right to 
support”, along the same lines as that provided for disabled 
persons and outpatients. On the other hand, the systems of 
repression have been reinforced, to curb the public insecurity 
engendered by the rise in economic and social insecurity. The 
ight is no longer against poverty. It is against the “wicked 
[whose] want leads them to have recourse to fraud and rap-
ine”, that Calvin stigmatized so long ago.
At the international level, the ultra-liberal revolution has 
resulted in the adoption of trade rules in every respect con-
trary to those proposed by the Havana Charter in 1948. They 
aim to sweep away all “regulatory barriers” to the circulation 
of goods and capital and to “true market prices”, and seek to 
engage every country in the world in a competition based on 
their respective “comparative advantages”. But this interna-
tional commercial law has been adopted without rescinding 
the economic and social rights proclaimed in the UDHR, and 
without abolishing the institutions tasked with their imple-
mentation, foremost among them the International Labor 
Organization. The upshot is a schizophrenic international le-
gal order, with its trade hemisphere inciting countries not to 
ratify, or not to apply, the standards that its social hemisphere 
proclaims as necessary and universal. And so we have the 
World Bank on the one hand supporting “anti-poverty plans” 
that strive to guarantee a universal income greater than one 
dollar a day, while on the other hand inciting states to abolish 
the rules that stipulate a minimum salary of more than 20 dol-
lars a month. This last recommendation can be found, along 
with others of the same ilk, in its report Doing Business in 
2005. Designed for use in benchmarking national laws, indi-
cators of this type are aimed at international investors–help-
ing them ind the “regulatory environments” most conducive 
to making large proits–and at states, engaging them in a 
competition to increase these proits across the board. These 
indicators are symptomatic of the more general belief that 
national laws are “legislative products” competing in a global 
market of standards, and that we should therefore facilitate 
“law shopping” by economic operators. The aim is to pro-
gressively eliminate the legal systems that are least well 
adapted to meeting the expectations of the inancial markets. 
But behind the pseudo-scientiic trappings of this “norma-
tive Darwinism” it is not hard to discern its religious under-
pinnings, its belief in an immanent order that destines some 
for prosperity and others for perdition; an order that must not 
be traversed by positive laws, rather, it must be facilitated by 
making the quest for personal enrichment the Grundnorm of 
the legal order. “In fact”, insists Hayek, “we generally are 
doing most good by pursuing gain”–an idea that was still 
seen as scandalous when it was irst put forward by Bernard 
Mandeville in 1714, but which has since become something 
of a cliché: private virtue leads to public virtue. This political 
philosophy, which makes other people the means to personal 
enrichment, is no more compatible with the principle of hu-
man dignity than law shopping is compatible with the rule of 
law. It is therefore doubtful whether it is sustainable in the 
long term, and its critique must not serve as a pretext for 
evading the problems raised by the erosion of the national 
solidarity systems put in place after the Second World War. 
These systems contributed hugely to a historically unprece-
dented reduction in poverty in the West. But, as Robert Reich 
so lucidly pointed out as early as 1992, their strength was 
undermined by the opening of borders to trade, allowing the 
richest members of society to evade the taxes and contribu-
tions through which national solidarity is funded. These ex-
ternal destabilizing factors were compounded by an internal 
factor. The enrolment of men and women into anonymous 
national support networks, guaranteeing everyone a degree of 
economic security, freed them from the burden of family and 
local solidarity, thus helping to sustain the illusion of the self-
suficient individual. The state–having become a universal 
debtor–engenders a nation of creditors who no longer recog-
nize any mutual duty of solidarity, and social demand eventu-
ally spirals out of the government’s control.
We cannot hope to ight poverty effectively by allocating 
individual rights–totally disconnected from solidarity net-
works–to the poor. However laudable the intentions behind 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, which assimilates social security entitlements to 
property rights, the worry is that this legal palliative will in-
fect social law with the belief that all debts can somehow be 
metamorphosed into payment orders, regardless of the na-
ture of the debtor. This confusion between entitlement and 
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property–whose destructive power was demonstrated by the 
inancial meltdown of 2008–overlooks the fact that the value 
of a debt is always conditional on the debtor meeting his 
obligations. The same applies to economic and social rights, 
which are debts whose value depends on the ability to en-
force the corresponding obligations, namely the requirement 
to pay taxes and social security contributions. There is no 
right to solidarity without a duty of solidarity, and everyone 
covered by a solidarity-based system is at once a creditor 
and a debtor of the system. From this viewpoint, it is not 
poverty that creates the right to assistance, but membership 
of a solidarity network in which everyone can alternately be 
a debtor and a creditor, according to their needs and resourc-
es. It is this that distinguishes modern social law from chari-
table institutions and makes it an instrument for the equality 
of dignity of all people. This arrangement is threatened ev-
ery time we give in to the temptation to return to charity, by 
reducing the scope of its beneiciaries to the poor. But it is 
also jeopardized when we permit the rule of law to give way 
to law shopping, allowing economic operators to relocate to 
the “iscal and regulatory environment” of their choice, and 
thus avoid funding the solidarity systems from which they 
beneit in the countries where they do business. 
Spurning the wise counsels of Francis Bacon, the inancial-
ization of the economy today leads us to pile money up rather 
than spread it around to fertilize human activity. The general 
downward pressure on costs, above all on labor costs, favors 
a dizzying accumulation of inancial proits, which, no longer 
inding an outlet in wealth creation, feed a stock-market 
 casino frenzy in which even basic foodstuffs become the 
 objects of speculative betting. At the same time, it leads to a 
disconnect between pay and productivity, the pauperization 
of states (engaged in a Dutch auction over social and tax con-
tributions), an overall reduction in the scope of solidarity, and 
the over-exploitation of natural resources. The answer to 
these dificulties does not lie in the myth of a global society 
made up of self-suficient individuals freed from all bonds of 
solidarity. Nor does it lie in the self-isolation of national soli-
darity systems: they are the backbone of our societies and 
must therefore evolve with them. The only way to deal with 
the destabilization of these systems is by harnessing the so-
cial state to the other circles of solidarity that are being traced 
out, in practice, within and beyond the national context. 
